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NOTES
THE PIT AND THE PATENTEE: TYING CLAUSES AS
ANTI-TRUST VIOLATIONS PER SE*
International Salt Co. v. United States' forcibly reemphasizes the precari-
ous position of the patentee who would use his patent as a lever to increase
bargaining power in markets other than that of his invention. The first step
beyond the immediate scope of his patent is now apt to be the long step into the
pit of per se violaion of the anti-trust laws.
International Salt owned valid patents for mechanical salt dispensers used
in canneries. These patented dispensers were leased with the stipulation that
the lessee must purchase salt only from the patentee. An equity suit was
brought by the Government, and, on a bare motion for summary judgment, the
leases were declared illegal per se under Section 1 of the Sherman Act2 and
Section 3 of the Clayton Act.3
It is certainly not new doctrine that the protection of the patent monopoly
extends only to the patent itself.4 And at least since 1917 the courts have as-
sumed that tie-in clauses conditioning use of the patent upon purchases of ma-
terials from the patentee are not within the scope of the patent.6 The problem,
* International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392 (1947).
1. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
2. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1940). "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal: . . ."
3. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1940). "It shall be unlawful for any person
engaged in commerce, . . . to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares,
merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented,
for use, consumption or resale within the United States or any territory thereof or the
District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the
United States, or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price,
on the condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not
use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities of
a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or
contract for sale or such condition, agreement or understanding may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."
4. Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659 (1895) ; Morgan Envelope Co.
v. Albany Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425 (1893). But cf. Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1
(1912) ; Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed. 288
(1896).
5. With Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502
(1917), tying clause agreements which by contract or affixed notice expressly restricted
the right to use unpatented materials with a patented article were declared unenforceable
in a situation of total market control. This principle has since been extended to cases
where the tying clause takes the form, not of a prohibition, but of a royalty discrimination
against licensees who purchase materials not covered by the patent from others than the
patentee. Dehydrators, Ltd. v. Petrolite Corp., 117 F.2d 183 (C.C.A. 9th 1941); Barber
Asphalt Corp. v. La Fera Grecco Contracting Co., 116 F.2d 211 (C.C.A. 3d 1940), on re-
however, has been one of selecting and defining the standards by which the
legality of such patent-abetted techniques of market control should be judged.
Mr. Justice Clarke had been clear that the tie-in clauses in the famous Mo-
tion Picture Patents case were outside the orbit of the patent, and "therefore"
that their legality was to be judged, like the exercise of other powers of prop-
erty, under "general" law." Without relying on the Clayton Act, he held the
tying clauses unenforceable, apparently on broad grounds of public policy.
Since then, however, and especially since Eric v. Tompkins, 7 the Supreme
Court has articulated an increasingly close relationship between the patent field
and the anti-trust laws. Initial cases here seemed to test the validity of devices
extending the competitive force of a patent with those factual analyses of mar-
ket control which were usually attendant upon determinations of "monopoly in
any line of commerce" under the Clayton Act.6
By 1942, however, the Court could, without enquiry into actual market con-
trol, deny relief to a patentee suing for direct infringement of a valid patent,
on the ground that his use of tie-in sales was contrary to the "policy" of the
Clayton Act.2 Still the Court refrained from holding tie-in agreements illegal
hearing aff'd, 116 F.2d 216 (C.C.A. 3d 1940); Oxford Varnish Co. v. Ault & Wiborg
Corp., 83 F.2d 764 (C.C.A. 6th 1936).
Nor have the courts been impressed by patentees who by withholding infringement
suits, tacitly license those, and only those, who purchase their unpatented materials from
the patentee. Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 453 (1938) ; American Lecithin Co.
v. Warfield Co., 105 F.2d 207 (C.C.A. 7th 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 609 (1939). The
difficulty of exploiting process patents invited practices of this type prior to their un-
qualified disapproval in B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942); Landis Machine
Co. v. Chaso Tool Co., 141 F2d 800 (C.C.A. 6th 1944).
The stricture has held whether the tied-in article is a staple or a necessary and ex-
clusive component of the patented process or combination. Mercoid v. Minneapolis-Honey-
well Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944) (staples-thermostatic switches); B. B. Chemical Co. Y.
Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942) (staples-webbing and rubber cement); International Busi-
ness Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (exclusively designed articles
-- cards for use in patented mechanical tabulators) ; Autographic Register Co. v. Sturgis
Register Co., 110 F2d 883 (C.C.A. 6th 1940): Philad Co. v. Lechler Laboratories, 107
F.2d 747 (C.C.A. 2d 1939); Alemite Corp. v. Lubrair Corp., 62 F.2d S99 (C.C.A. Ist
1933).
Section 3 of the Clayton Act applies whether the tie-in embraces a patented or un-
patented article. Mercoid v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Co., 320 U.S. 6SO (1944); Interna-
tional Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) ; Carbice Corp. v.
American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
6. 243 U.S. 502, 512-13 (1917).
7. 304 U.S. 64 (1933). The nominal abolition of federal common law under the Erie
rule would seem incompatible with the rationale of the Motion Picture Patents case. To
achieve the same result the logic of the Erie rule would require that a new doctrinal basis
be found.
8. Pick Manufacturing Co. v. General Motors Corp., 299 U.S. 3 (1936); FTC v.
Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923); United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United
States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922). Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931),
where for purposes of the Sherman Act market analysis under the rule of reason is also
employed.
9. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 483 (1942). In Carbice Corp. v.
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under the anti-trust laws themselves. By refusing equitable relief to the pat-
entee through a doctrine akin to "unclean hands," the leverage of the tie-in was
defeated. But, also, in order to keep a semblance of balance between the
parties, the infringer was denied treble damages.
With the much debated Mercoid cases' ° there finally appears in recognizable
form the doctrine that the patentee must be held to a higher standard under the
anti-trust statutes than other members of the competitive business community.
Said Mr. Justice Douglas for the majority:
"The legality of any attempt to bring unpatented goods within the
protection of the patent is measured by the anti-trust laws not by the
patent law. . . . [T]he effort here made to control competition in
this unpatented device plainly violates the anti-trust laws. .. .
The International Salt case represents a vital next step in logical sequence.
With the issue of legality squarely raised by the Government's suit under the
Clayton and Sherman Acts the Court has brought agreements tying unpat-
ented materials with the patent into the rapidly growing area of illegality per
se, or almost per se. For there is still in Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion the sug-
gestion of a bow in the direction of the older concepts of market control: "The
volume of business affected by these contracts cannot be said to be insignificant
or insubstantial .... ,,1 Nonetheless, for all practical purposes International
Salt, along with Masonite,3 now stands with Trenton Potteries14 among the
so-called exceptions to the rule of reason-"exceptions" so powerful and in-
clusive as to overshadow the older rule. Pragmatically speaking, the stringent
remedy of treble damages will now be available, and without lengthy trial on
issues of the reality and reasonableness of market control which have charac-
terized patent anti-trust litigation.
In these cases the Supreme Court apparently starts with the premise that the
patent monopoly itself is a special privilege potentially susceptible of abuses
which can throttle competition to an important degree, and therefore that any
attempt to use a patent to increase bargaining power should be forbidden in
the name of the policy of the anti-trust laws. It is certainly clear that any at-
tempt to broaden the scope of the protected patent monopoly would inevitably
limit and perhaps eliminate actual or potential producers of the tied product,
and might enable the patentee to fix the price of the tied product.',
American Patents Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931) the Court denied relief against contributory
infringement where the patentee had sought to restrain the sale to licensees of a competing
unpatented article. The Morton case goes further and denies relief for direct infringement
where the patentee had sought to use his patent to monopolize an unpatented article.
10. Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944);
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
11. Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 684 (1944).
But note that four justices concurred solely on the authority of Morton Salt Co. v. G. S.
Stippiger, 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
12. 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
13. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
14. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
15. See MiLLER, UNFAIR CoMPETiTON, c. X (1941) (a treatment of the possible mar-
ket control effects of patent tie-in agreements).
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The logical premise of the International Salt case, however, would seem to
require a similar result in the situation where patents are tied not to unpat-
ented commodities, but to other patents-perhaps a fortiori since potentialities
of abuse would appear to be multiplied as patent control is extended.1  But
where the case at bar has concerned patents in combination, the law has been
more brave in dicta than in holding.17 Here the "rule of reason" has so far
been retained. 18 Guarded sanction has been accorded patent pooling arrange-
ments assertedly in consideration of the statutory assignability of patents,' 9
the inexpeditious procedures presently available for resolving conflicting pat-
ent claims and the need for an efficient union of technological processes,2 0
By abandoning in the International Salt case the criterion of reasonableness
upon which the patent pooling cases have turned, does the Court imply that it
16. The considerations which circumscribe the patent in its orbit recognize that ex-
tension of that orbit comes to be used as a warrant for:
"(a) The extension of the patent monopoly itself.
(b) The rationalization and even suppression of competition.
(c) The use of the license as an instrument of business warfare and economic
control.
(d) The reduction of capacity and the restriction of output.
(e) The division of the market into proprietary desmesne-
(f) The creation of a private government for an industry.
(g) The use of the public courts to police an industry and to punish those who
break its laws." Brief for the United States as Ainicus Curiae, p. 65, Ifercoid
Corp. y. Mlid Continent Investment Co. 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
17. See Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 459 (1940) ("The
patent monopoly of one invention may no more be enlarged for the e.'ploitation of an-
other.., than for the exploitation of an unpatented article...."); Standard Oil Co.
v. United States 283 U.S. 163, 174 (1931) ("The lawful individual monopolies granted
by the patent statutes cannot be unitedly exercised to restrain competition!'). But ef.
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
18. Judicial willingness to differentiate "between legitimate use and prohibited abuse
of the restrictions incident to [patent combination]" has permitted development of a
variety of arrangements designed to extend the patent monopoly. The tie-in of a promise
to license back improvement patents is a typical arrangement of most patent pools, and
where, as was true in the glass industry, the pool is conducted by a central licensing au-
thority, the licenses are often required, as a prerequisite to admission to the pool, not
only to license but to assign back to the licensing authority all of their improvement
patents. Another practice common to patent pools is a requirement that licensees tal:e
blocks of patents that they neither need nor wrant-a requirement particularly endemic to
industries whose patents may be grouped into technical areas for licensing as a package
rather than singly.
None of these devices is comprehended by the limited monopoly of the patent
grant. Each can be readily employed as a bargaining weapon with which to capture
technological advance. Hearings before the Temporary Arational Economic Consmitlee,
Part 3, Proposals for Changes in Law and Procedure, 835-1159; Part 31a, Lertes of Con-
way P. Coe and Thurman Arnold, 18471-S9; Final Report and Rccommcndations, S.
Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pursuant to Public Resolution No. 113, 75th Cong.,
36-7.
19. Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
20. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931).
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will follow the logic of its own premise and declare tie-ins of patent with pat-
ent to be equally illegal? An immediately antecedent decision suggests that the
Court may not be disturbed by logical inconsistency and may not be ready to
leave to Congress the task of assessing the necessity for special treatment of
patent combinations. In Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v, Stokes & Smith
Co. it was held that the requirement that a licensee assign his improvement
patents to the patentee was not an illegal tie-in agreement.2' The extent to
which the Justices have now meant to undercut the Transwrap decision is the
measure of the ultimate doctrinal thrust of International Salt v. United States.
For the present, the hand of the party attacking a tie-in arrangement has been
tremendously strengthened. For the patentee who walks on the brink of anti-
trust violation, the precipice has been brought closer and its height increased
by the International Salt decision.
PROCEDURAL "DUE PROCESS" IN UNION DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDINGS*
PROTECTION of the individual union member against his union is a uniquely
contemporary problem. Libertarian political science of the 18th Century con-
ceived the task of perpetuating a democratic society largely as a problem of
protecting the individual against authoritarian repression by the State.' Auto-
cratic action by organizations not strictly governmental was considered either
of little significance in its effect on "democracy," or was thought to be a matter
of "private" concern, beyond the proper scope of institutional protection. But
the problem of maintaining an actual and meaningful "democracy" in today's
pluralistic society is far more complex than an elementary State-versus-indi-
vidual calculus would indicate.
2
21. 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
* State ex rel. Dame v. Le Fevre, 251 Wis. 146, 28 N.W. 2d 349 (1947).
1. See LocKE, OF CIviL GOVRNMENT bk. 2, c. v. viii (general description of society),
c. xviii (Of Tyranny) (1690); MONTEsQuxEu, DE L'ESPIT DEs Lois bk. 11, cc, 1-vi
(Political Liberty) (1777); U. S. CoNsT. AmENDS. I-X, XIII-XV.
2. For slowly expanding judicial awareness of this complexity, see Munn v. Illinois,
94 U. S. 113 (1877) (regulation of businesses "clothed with the public interest") - Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (state statute fixing maximum hours of employment of
females upheld) ; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (state may fix selling price
of milk); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (fixing of minimum
wages for women and minors within police power of state) ; NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (federal regulation of labor-management relations a valid
exercise of "commerce" power) ; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (Congress
may fix minimum wages and maximum hours of employees "engaged" in production of
goods for interstate commerce) ; North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686 (1946) (public
utility holding companies may be restricted to single integrated system) ; Marsh v. Ala-
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A more realistic analysis reveals the individual in contemporary society
thrown into close contact with powerful organized groups, many of which are
not literally "governmental" in the traditional sense, but all of which are sus-
ceptible to the abuses of concentrated control. Wherever the relations of the
individual to any such group constitute a vital aspect of his economic, social or
political life, serious problems of maintaining functional democracy recom-
mend themselves to the attention of society. The position of the individual
workman with respect to his union stands as a case in point.
Ink need not be expended describing the dominant role played by labor un-
ions today in the lives of 15,000,0003 American workers. Not only is union
membership a job prerequisite for millions of workers," but it provides an es-
sential vehicle by which workers may achieve basic democratic goals---economic
security,5 participation in industrial government,0 fellowship and respect of
other people.7 Internal union democracy,8 freedom to criticize and oppose un-
bana, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (free speech protected on thoroughfare in company town) ;
Smith v. Allhwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (party imposed discrimination in primaries ille-
gal under Fourteenth Amendment). See note 30 infra.
3. DIRECTORY or LABOR UNIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, BunzAu or LAroa STATIs-
Tics BuLu. No. 901, p. 1 (1947) (figures as of beginning of 1947).
4. In 1946 approximately 11,000,000 workers were subject to collective bargaining
agreements requiring union membership as a condition of employment. U.I.IoN.-SEcur"
PRovisioNs iN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS BULL. No. 903, p. 6
(1947). The closed shop--employer may hire only union members--has been outlawed
by § 8(a) (3) of the Taft-Hartley Act. Pub. L. No. 101, 90th Cong., 1st Ses. (1947), 29
U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq. (Supp. 1947). However, union security agreements are still per-
mitted in the form of a union shop-those hired must join union within specified time--if
authorized by a majority of employees eligible to vote in a bargaining unit as provided in
§ 9(e) (1). For many workers, expulsion from their union may mean loss of sldll, in
addition to loss of a job.
5. In addition to bargaining for economic advantages, and joint union-management
welfare plans, many unions contribute material benefits to members through their own
insurance, health, unemployment, welfare, and education programs. See generally,
UNION HEALTH AND WELFARE PLANS, BuPz u OF LAMCR STATISTICs BULL. No. 900
(1947); Minkoff, Trade-Union Welfare Programs, 64 MONTHLY LAn. REv. 201 (1947);
Rosenthal, Union-Managcment Welfare Plans, 62 Q. J. Eco.N. 64 (1947); Held. Hcalth
and Welfare Funds in the Needle Trades, 1 INDUS. & LAn. RE!.. REv. 247 (1948).
6. ".... The struggle of labor for organization is not merely an attempt to secure
an increased measure of the material comforts of life, but is a part of the age-long
struggle for liberty" Final Report, Commission on Industrial Rclations, SEN. Doc. No.
415, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1916). "There must be a division not only of the profits,
but a division of the responsibilies; and the men must have the opportunity of deciding,
in part, what shall be their condition and how the business shall be run." Testimony of
Mr. Louis D. Brandeis, id. at 64.
7. Important factors motivating workers to join unions are that membership en-
hances a worker's personal integrity, and spreads comradeship on the job and in the
community. Bakke, Why Workers Join Unions, 22 PunsoN-rE. No. 1, 1 (1945). See also
Tannenbaum, Social Function of Trade Unionism, 62 POL Sci. Q. 161 (1947).
8. Commonly accepted requisites of trade union democracy are: non-discriminatory
admission policies; reasonable initiation fees; regular meetings and conventions; fair and
secret elections; free discussion within the union of all union problems; control of dues,
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ion officials without fear of arbitrary discipline, may possibly be as meaningful
to union members as their civil rights as citizens of the state.
Adjustment of the relations of the union member with his union involves a
difficult balancing of ihe desirability of individual expression against the
need of a militant organization for a unified, well-disciplined membershipY
Abuses in some unions indicate that the scales have been weighted against the
individual member. The growth of centralized union administration has
brought an increase in misuse of disciplinary power ;1O summary expulsions
without trial and for vague substantive offenses have not been unknown." Un-
assessments and finances by the membership; periodic financial reports; equal treatment
with respect to job placement and seniority rights; protection against discipline without
reasonable cause; and procedural "due process." AMERICAN CIVIL LinETirIs UNION,
DzmocRAcY IN TRADE UNIONs 68-9 (1943). See generally, Witmer, Civil Liberties and
the Trade Uniolt, 50 YALE L. J. 621 (1941) ; Taft, Democracy in Trade Unions, 36 AM.
EcoN. REV. Supp. 359 (1946) ; Murdock, Some Aspects of Employee Democracy Under the
Wagner Act, 32 CORN. L. Q. 73 (1946). On discriminatory admission policies, see Sum-
mers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 COL. L. REV. 33 (1947) ; and Admission Policies of
Labor Unions, 61 Q. J. EcoN. 66 (1946); Newman, The Closed Union and the Right to
Work, 43 COL. L. REv. 42 (1943).
9. Discipline is essential to enable the union to present a common front to employers;
and to meet demands of employers that the national organization curb local wildcat
strikes and compel compliance with contracts. Indeed, self-preservation itself requires
that the union have power to oust agents of employers and rival unions seeking to de-
stroy it from within. Taft, Judicial Procedure in Labor Unions, 59 Q. J. EcoN. 370-1,
380 and passim (1945).
10. A recent study of 167 national constitutions reveals the seeds of potential abuses
embedded in these very documents. Suspensions without trial of local officers in 30 unions,
of national officers in 36 unions, and of subordinate units in 63 unions are specifically
authorized. Shister, Trade-Union Government-A Formal Analysis, 60 Q. J. EcoN. 78,
94, n. 3 (1945). National constitutions of 60 unions are silent on the need for trials in
local disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 100, n. 6. Even the highly democratic Typographical
Union-motivated by a secession movement in 1943-provided for Executive Council ex-
pulsion without trial of any member aiding a rival union. INT.RNATIONAL TYPOGRAIu-
ICAL UNION PRoCEMINGS, EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONVENTION 72 (1944). The president of
the Mine Workers may suspend executive board members-the appellate tribunal-for
insubordination. United Mine Workers, Const., Art. IX, § 3 (1940). "There is an ob-
vious need for the establishment of union tribunals distinct from the legislative and ad-
ministrative offices of the Union." Chamberlain, The Judicial Process it; Labor Unions,
10 BROOKLYN L. REV. 145, 162 (1940).
Prosecutions designed to stifle free expression within the union are facilitated by
the following vague grounds for discipline disclosed by an examination of 81 union con-
stitutions: violation of union constitution, by-laws, and rules (36 unions) ; disobedience of
orders of officers (6 unions) ; slandering an officer or member (29 unions) ; circulating
written material dealing with union business among members without executive board
approval (21 unions) ; creating dissension (15 unions) ; and undermining the union (20
unions). Taft, supra note 9, at 377-81. See also, Chamberlain, supra at 145-48.
11. Many abuses probably never come to light because aggrieved workers lack pub-
licity channels and the means for court relief. Moreover, many potential abuses are prob-
ably not precipitated because the mere threat of arbitrary expulsion is often sufficient to
silence opposition. See Taft, suipra note 9, at 376, 384-5. Nevertheless, there is ample
evidence of past arbitrary discipline by racketeers and autocratic leaders in some unions.
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restricted control by the union leadership is unacceptable to a democratic social
philosophy, but unlimited freedom of action by the union member is not prac-
ticable. A complete body of substantive principles governing the intricate rela-
tions of union and member, though slowly evolving, may not yet be formulable
so as to provide adequately for the needs of both.' 2 But it would not seem pre-
mature to suggest that procedural due process represents a minimal societal
requirement 13 protecting the individual workman from excesses on the part of
Expulsions or suspensions of members, officers and even entire locals have occurred de-
spite lack of notice, a hearing, an unbiased tribunal and the right of cross-examination. See
cases cited note 34 infra.
Substantive grounds for expulsion have included: testimony under subpoena before
an administrative agency, Abdon v. Wallace, 95 Ind. App. 604, 165 N.E. 63 (1929);
testimony in court, St. Louis S.V. Ry. v. Thompson, 102 Tex. 89, 113 S.W. 144 (1903) ;
petitioning state legislature to repeal a law advocated by union, Spayd v. Ringing Rock
Lodge No. 665, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 270 Pa. St. 67, 113 Ad. 70 (1921) ; voting
for another union in an election under the Railway Labor Act, Ray v. Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen, 182 Wash. 39, 44 P. 2d 787 (1935); acting as an observer for a rival
union at an NLRB election, Local No. 2880, Lumber and Sawmill Workers v. NLRB,
158 F.2d 365 (C.C.A. 9th 1946) ; and opposition to candidate backed by union officials in
1944 Presidential election, Morgan v. Local 1150, United Electrical Workers, 16 Lab. Rd.
Rep. 720 (Ill. Super. Ct. 1945), rcv'd, 72 N.E. 2d 59 (Ill. App. 1947). Similar abuses
have been unearthed by civic groups, AuxmFi.rN CIrVL Lnmxrxs UIo, op. cit. supra
note 8, at 39, 68; CITY CLUB OF NEw YORK, REPORT oz CERTAIN AsPECTS OF LAr on
UNioN RasPoNsimnYrv AND CoOL 16 (1937), and Congressional committees, San.
REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1947). See generally Snm, 'tx, UmotN RIonTs
AND UNION DUTiEs c. 2 (1943); Chamberlain, supra note 10, at 162-5; fintz, Trade
Union Abuses, 6 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 272 (1932) ; Steever, The Control of Labor Through
Union Discipline, 16 CoRx. L. Q. 212 (1931); Note, 56 YALE L. J. 1048 (1947); Com-
ment, 45 YALE L. J. 1248 (1936).
12. For disciplinary provisions in union constitutions approved by one organization,
see AmIcAN Civit LmERTIES UxION, op. cit. supra note 8, Surp. at 3-5.
13. Legal protection and encouragement of unionism contained in federal and state
labor relations acts is often asserted as the justification for government action. E.g.,
see S M dAN, op. cit. mpra note 11, at 206. Indeed, a union certified as bargaining repre-
sentative by the state has been termed an "agency" of the federal government and there-
fore subject to the Fifth Amendment. Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P. 2d 831
(1946) ; Note, 56 YALE L. J. 731 (1946). But suppose unions choose to forego their legal
rights, as has been done by certain unions which refuse to submit non-Communist affi-
davits required by § 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act. N. Y. Times, May 18, 1948, p. 17,
col. 4 (United Steelworkers, CIO). Or suppose all laws protecting unions are repealed.
Many unions would still retain economic power and wield great influence over workers.
Hence it would seem preferable to look to the prevalence of union power and internal
abuses rather than to a notion of legal reciprocity to justify societal intervention. Cf.
Rice v. Elmore, 165 F. 2d 387 (C.C.A. 4th 1947), cert. dnicd, 68 S. Ct. 905 (1948)
(political party not a "private club," although all state laws regulating primaries re-
pealed, and may not restrict primary voting) ; Smith v. Allwright, supra note 2.
One writer, who reflects union sentiment, opposes extension of judicial, and presum-
ably administrative, review of union disciplinary actions as "an unnecessary interference
... with the internal affairs of unions.... To ask a court to substitute itself for a union
tribunal is to invite the ultimate destruction of the union itself." Thatcher, Shall JVe
Have Afore Regulation of the Intenal Affairs of Labor Unions? 7 LAw Gim
REv. 14, 16 (1947). For instances in which courts' antipathy to unions has influenced
decisions, see Comment, Disputes Within Trade Unions, 45 YALE L. J. 1248, 1265 (1936).
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his private government, the union.14
Most internal unions have found it possible to compromise,15 to retain suf-
ficient disciplinary powers while generally maintaining self-imposed standards
of "fair play"'16 toward a member allegedly erring. Internal remedies are
available to curb deviations by subordinate locals.17 But no machinery exists
within either the AFL or the CIO for an impartial appeal from a final decision
of an affiliated international union which violates or tolerates violations of com-
mon notions of "due process." Where internal remedies have been unavailable,
14. Even unions which operate under democratic disciplinary processes may be
tempted to depart therefrom in the heat of internal political and ideological strife prevalent
today in some unions. An instance of such strife within Local 301 of the United Electrical
Workers, C.I.O. is contained in the files of the American Civil Liberties Union (expul-
sion of leaders of anti-Communist faction). See also N.Y. Times, June 4, 1948, p. 1,
col. 2 (expulsion of anti-Communist leaders from Local 3, Retail, Wholesale and Depart-
ment Store Union, C.I.O.). Moreover, certain unions are gradually being forced to
change their discriminatory admission policies. AmERICAN CIVIL LiDERTIES UNION,
LBERTY ON THE HOME FRONT 44 (1945) ; Note, 56 YALE L. J. 731, 735 n. 29 (1947).
These democratic gains might be negated if unions are permitted to expel arbitrarily
workers begrudgingly admitted to membership.
15. The great majority of unions are free of disciplinary abuses. AmEniCAN CIVIL
LmERTIEs UNION, op. cit. supra note 8, at 39. "Although arbitrary action . . . against
* * * members is certainly not unknown, it can not be called common. Our present in-
formation furnishes no basis for estimates." Taft, supra note 9, at 376. ". . . ma-
chinists, printers, railway unions, hatters, some of the garment trades, and a number of
other unions are not in danger of abuse of power by the top officials. It would be unsafe
to say as much for the unions in the building trades and in the coal-mining industry."
Id. at 385.
16. Union disciplinary procedures usually provide for filing of specific charges in writ-
ing, membership referral of charges to a trial committee, timely notice of charges to the
accused, and a hearing thereon. Each side may select counsel from among union members,
and some unions permit members of the trial committee to be challenged. The accused has
the right to present evidence and to cross-examine prosecution witnesses. A trial com-
mittee verdict-majority vote usually suffices-is generally no more than a recommenda-
tion to the next local meeting at which the accused must be present. An accused in
effect thus receives a second hearing when he appears before the membership which may
accept, reject or amend the recommendations by either a majority, two-thirds, or three-
fourths vote. If a verdict of guilty is approved, a penalty of a fine or reprimand usually
requires a majority vote, while a two-thirds or three-fourths vote is required for suspen-
sion or expulsion. Taft, slpra note 9, at 381-4. In some unions, the national president,
executive board, or both, may initiate and hear charges against members of subordinate
units. "Even when the authority to try members is not expressly given, the general offi-
cers can force the locals to act, because they usually have the authority to intervene in the
affairs of the union and to suspend and replace officers." Id. at 384. See also Shister,
supra note 10 at 100, n. 6.
17. Virtually all unions permit appeals by either accuser or accused. The usual line
of appeal from original verdicts of locals is to the national president, executive board, and
the convention. Shister, supra note 10, at 100, n. 6. Some unions do not enforce the
penalty while an appeal is pending, other unions do, and the constitutions of several unions
are silent on this matter. Taft, supra note 9, at 383. Union appeals machinery has been
criticized as too slow and complex. Reynolds, commenting on Taft, Denocracy in Trade
Unions, 36 Am. EcoN. REv. Supp. 359, 383 (1946) ; Chamberlain, supra note 10, at 168.
[Vol. 571306
NOTES
or have failed to remedy abuses, the aggrieved have resorted to the courts.
Their reception has not always been cordial.
Dame, a union member and officer, was accused of breaching the union's
secrecy provisions,' 8 an offense punishable by expulsion.' 0 The constitution
provided no procedure for such disciplinary action. Notified to attend an ap-
parently routine executive board meeting,-0 Dame, like the Oysters invited to
dine, was kept in ignorance of the purpose of the gathering. Suddenly con-
fronted with the charges placed against him, .he refused to stand trial without
preparation. Nevertheless, by a narrow seven-to-six vote, Dame was expelled
from the union, and, though he did not lose his job, was deprived of the emolu-
ments and prestige of his union offices.21 By-passing a potential internal ap-
peal,z2 Dame brought against the union a mandamus action for reinstatement,
State ex rel. Dame v. Le Fevre.2
In securing an adjudication on the merits, Dame was in a sense fortunate.
Many similar complainants seeking reinstatement have, by failing to comply
with various technical requirements, been denied a determination of the actual
due process issue. Non-exhaustion of internal union appeal machinery appears
to be the most frequent ground for dismissing complaints.24 Some courts have
18. "All business of the union shall be kept strictly private from persons who are not
members of the union, unless publication... is authorized by the general executive
board or general council." Const., Telephone Guild of Wisconsin, Art. IV, § 4(B) (1933).
Dame's alleged infraction arose out of his forvarding to the Telephone Company a resolu-
tion passed by the Racine district-headed by Dame-criticizing the manner in which Guild
officers were negotiating with the company. The resolution directed only that a copy b2
sent to the executive officers and that it be published in The Guild News. State cx rel.
Dame v. Le Fevre, 251 Wis. 146, 23 NAV. 2d 349, 352-3 (1947).
19. "Any violation of this section shall be punished by assessment, suspension or ex-
pulsion as the general executive board may decree." Const., Telephone Guild of Wiscon-
sin, Art. IV, § 4(C) (1938).
20. The meeting was called by the general president at the instance of the Milvmulee
locals which desired to bring Dame to trial. Brief for Appellants, p. 134, State cx rcl.
Dame v. Le Fevre, 251 Wis. 146, 28 N.W. 2d 349 (1947).
21. As president of his local, Dame was entitled to $1.00 per regular and special meet-
ing, and to $30.00 per year as chairman of his district council. Cost., Telephone Guild of
Wisconsin, Art. V, §4(10). Article II, B authorizes the union to render aid "to members
who are sick or in trouble," but this provision had not been put into practice at the time
of suit. Brief for Appellees, p. 22, State ex reL Dame v. LeFevre, 251 Wis. 146, 23
N.W. 2d 349 (1947).
22. "All acts of the general executive board shall stand as the acts of the general
council unless reversed by that body." Const., Telephone Guild of Wisconsin, Art. VI,
§2(A) (3) (1938).
23. 251 Wis. 146,28 NAV. 2d 349 (1947).
24. The general rule is that an aggrieved member may not resort to the courts until
he has exhausted internal union remedies as provided in the union constitution even if
hardships might result. Dragwa v. Federal Labor Union No. 23070, 136 N.J. Eq. 172,
41 A.2d 32 (1945) (general rule applied where "property rights" involved) ; Bush v. In-
ternational Alliance of Theatre Stage Employees, 55 Cal. App. 2d 357, 130 P2d 73
(1942) (relief denied where plaintiff failed to appeal to convention after having appealed
to international president and executive board) ; Note, Exhaustion of Remcdics Witlin
Labor Union as Condition of Resort to Cizil Courts by Expellcd or Susperdcd Mrembcr,
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refused to entertain mandamus actions against unincorporated unions operat-
ing without a "franchise" from the sovereign.2 5 A philosophic determination
168 A. L. R. 1462, 1463 (1947). However, the exceptions to this rule are legion. While
the rule covers actions for specific relief, an action for damages is exempt on the theory
that internal reversal of a penalty would not fully redress injury to "property rights."
Id. at 1482; Smith v. International Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Union, 190 S.W.2d
769 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) ; rez/d on other grounds, 198 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1946). Even
in actions for specific relief, "if property rights are involved, in the absence of an express
agreement to exhaust the remedies . . .the member may resort to the courts .... [Like-
wise] if [the remedies] would be futile, illusory or vain." Nissen v. International Brother-
hood of Teamsters etc., 229 Iowa 1028, 1042-3, 295 N.W. 858, 866 (1941). "Also if the
action of the association is wrongful, or without jurisdiction, or is without notice or au-
thority, or not in compliance with the rules or constitutional provisions, or is void for
any reason ... ." Id. at 1043, 295 N.W. at 867 (citing cases). See also Leo v. Local
Union No. 612 of International Union of Operating Engineers, 26 Wash. 2d 498, 174 P.2d
523 (1946) (court has jurisdiction where entire proceeding void because charge not author-
ized by union constitution) ; Local Union No. 57, Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators
and Paperhangers v. Boyd, 245 Ala. 227, 236, 16 So. 2d 705, 712 (1944) (delay in meeting
of executive board). Witmer has criticized the growth of so many exceptions to the rule.
Supra note 8, at 630, n.35.
The issue of exhausting internal remedies was not discussed in the Dame case. How-
ever, the court below held plaintiff's internal remedy to have been "vague and inadequate."
Opinion quoted in Brief for Appellants, p. 101, 114, State ex rel. Dame v. Le Fevre, 251
Wis. 146, 28 N.W. 2d 349 (1947). See note 22, supra.
25. While mandamus will issue to an incorporated union as a "creature of the state,"
it will generally not issue to an unincorporated union. A member of the latter has only a
"private contract right," and he must seek specific relief in equity. OAKES, THE LAW OF
ORGANIZED LABOR & INDUSTRIAL CONFLICTS, § 66 (1927); Note, Mandamus to Compel
Reinstatement of Suspended or Expelled Members of Labor Union, 141 A.L.R. 617, 618
(1942). An exception in some states permits mandamus to issue to an unincorporated
union if "property rights" are involved. Smetherham v. Laundry Workers' Union, Local
No. 75, 44 Cal. App. 2d 131, 111 P,2d 948 (1948) (right to a job); Nissen v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., 229 Iowa 1028, 295 N.W. 858 (1941) (same). But an ac-
tion of mandamus is made equitable by statute in Iowa. II CODE OF IowA, § 661.3 (1946).
A recent case holding that a union officer has a "vested right" to his office and allowing
mandamus to issue, seems to abolish the paper distinction between incorporated and unin-
corporated unions. ". . . [Labor] organizations are no longer comparable to voluntary fra-
ternal orders, . . .they are sti generis, and approximate corporations in their methods of
operation and powers." Elevator Operators and Starters Union, Local 117 v. Newman, 180
P. 2d 42, 48 (Cal. App. 1947) ; modified, 186 P. 2d 1 (Cal. 1947). But cf. 1 TELLER, LABOR
DISPUTES AND CoLLEcrvE BARGAINING 291 (1940) (incorporated unions governed by the
law of corporations, and unincorporated unions by the law of voluntary associations). Yet
cases involving both types of unions are cited interchangeably in the reports, which indi-
cates the distinction is not as sharp as drawn by Teller. E.g., see cases cited in Polin v.
Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931).
Plaintiff in the Dame case hoped that the Wisconsin courts, on a question of first
impression, would consider state statutory control of unions justification for disregarding
the distinction, and allow mandamus to issue to the unincorporated defendant union,
Alternatively, he relied on the "property rights" exception to the rule, on the ground he
was deprived of potential benefits under Art. II, § B of the Guild constitution (see note 21,
sispra), and of the aid of the Guild in controversies with his employer. Brief for Ap.
pellees pp. 21-2, State ex rel. Dame v. Le Fevre, 251 Wis. 146, 28 N.W. 2d 349 (1947).
The court below in granting mandamus, upheld plaintiff on both theories and said:
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that "property rights" are not involved-an independent ground for denial of
equitable relief2 6-- has been coupled as an additional ground for dismissal.
"the court may well take judicial notice ... that membership itself in an association
[like] ... the Guild. . . , with its necessary incidents ... is a valuable property
right." Opinion quoted in Brief for Appellants, p. 101, 104. See discussion of "property
rights," note 26 infra.
26. The "property rights" requirement was early applied to a suit for reinstatement
in a union. Rigby v. Connol, 14 Ch. Div. 482 (180). Professor Chafee has seemingly
interpreted denial of relief in this case as standing for the proposition that union member-
ship does not involve "property rights." Chafee, Internal Affairs of Associations Not
for Profit, 43 HaRv. L. REv. 993, 1001 (1930). While the decision may be explained by
plaintiff's failure to allege injury to property, the court relied too on broader grounds.
Even in this early case plaintiff's right to participate in benefit funds was recognized as
"property rights" which equity would protect. But relief was precluded by the Trades Un-
ion Act of 1871, and by the fact that the union w.-as an unlawful association. Rigby v. Con-
nol, supra at 487.
Although Dean Pound has pointed out the fictional nature of the "property rights"
requirement, Pound, Equitable Relief Agaizst Defamation and Injuries to Pcrsonality, 29
HARv. L. Ryv. 640, 678 (1916), it finds uniform acceptance in the reports. Note, 163
A. L. R. 1462, 1479 (1947). Perhaps plaintiff in the Dame case eschewed equitable re-
lief because of anticipated difficulty in demonstrating injury to "property." (In a manda-
mus action, plaintiff could rely on an alternative theory even if he failed to come under the
"property rights" exception to the rule barring issuance of mandamus to unincorporated
unions. See note 25 supra). Yet few American cases have actually denied relief to
wrongfully e.xpelled union members or locals solely because "property rights" were not
involved. Cf. O'Brien v. Musical Mutual Protective & Benevolent Union, Local No. 14,
64 N.J. Eq. 525, 54 AUt. 150 (1903).
Virtually all courts today recognize the right to a job, and interests in benefit funds
as "property rights." Note, 168 A.L.R. 1462, 1479-82 (1947). An interest in the treasury
surplus and property of a union is also considered "property." Weiss v. Musical Mut.
Protective Union, 189 Pa. St. 446, 42 A. 118 (1899) (incorporated union); Rodier v.
Huddell, 232 App. Div. 531, 250 N.Y.S. 336 (1st Dept. 1931) (unincorporated union);
McNichols v. International Typographical Union, 63 F.2d 490 (C.C.A. 7th 1933). But
cf. Hall v. Morrin, 293 S.W. 435 440, (Mo. App. 1927) citing State ex rl. Hyde v.
Jackson County Medical Soe'y, 295 Mo. 144, 243 S.W. 341 (1922) (relief denied because
plaintiff had no severable proprietary interest in real estate owned by society).
Seniority rights have been called "contract rights" in the past, but the tendency is to
regard them as "property." Note, 142 A.L.R. 1055, 1060-61 (1943). Some courts refer
to the benefit of collective bargaining as a "property right." Obergfeli v. Green, 29 F.
Supp. 589, 591 (1939) ; Note, 49 Y.r L. J. 329 (1939) ; rc'2d on other grounds, 121
F2d 46 (App. D.C. 1941). Even internal incidents of union membership are labelled
"property rights" by some courts. E.g., Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Ifisc. 35, 29 X.Y.S2d
882 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (member has enforceable interest in union election and accounting of
union funds as required by union constitution). But cf., Carey v. International Brother-
hood of Paper Makers, 123 Misc. 680, 206 N.Y. Supp. 73 (Sup. Ct. 1924) (dispute over
election returns for office carrying annual salary of $5,000 does not involve property
rights). The During case apparently adheres to the theory that a "contract of member-
ship" is a sufficient "property" interest to warrant equitable relief for its breach. Krause
v. Sander, 66 Misc. 601, 122 N.Y. Supp. 54 (Sup. Ct. 1910). "The courts seem to feel
that the presence of a contract overcomes the orthodox difficulty of giving relief, when the
member would otherwise be held to have only interests of personality." Chafee, sispra
at 1002. However, one writer disputes the notion that courts "protect the contract as
property. They enforce it specifically because damages for its breach would be inad-
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Availability of the remedy of damages 27 may be negated by procedural diffi-
culties in shing the union. 28 Moreover, damages would seem an inadequate
remedy when reinstatement is desired. The court in the Dame case, however,
attacked the merits of the case, liberally asserting its willingness to grant what-
ever legal or equitable relief it found to be warranted by the facts.2
But no relief was found warranted. The Wisconsin Supreme Court con-
ceived the issue as one of implying into the union constitution a requirement
that plaintiff be accorded "the requisites of a common law hearing." In a
unanimous reversal, it held plaintiff was not entitled to "the requisites of a
common law hearing," since none was provided for in the "contract" of mem-
equate." WALSH, EQUITY 276 n. 38 (1930). Dean Pound has criticized the "contract
theory" of equitable jurisdiction as inexpedient "from the standpoint of dispatch of pub-
lic business in the courts." Pound, supra at 680-1. One court states in a dictum that equity
may protect personal and property rights of individuals in their membership, American
Federation of Labor v. Mann, 188 S.W. 2d 276, 286 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
Thus in the borderline situation of the principal case where plaintiff retained his job
and the union had no benefit funds, it would require a liberal construction of "property
rights" to obtain equitable relief, even if the expulsion be wrongful. Suits for injunctive
relief by members against their own unions have been held not to constitute "labor dis-
putes" within anti-injunction statutes. Note, Suit Between Labor Organizations or Mem-
bers Thereof as Involving A Labor Dispute Within Anti-Injunction Statutes, 138 A.L.R.
287, 297 (1942). But cf. Obergfell v. Green, 121 F. 2d 46 (App, D.C. 1941).
27. It is generally held that one unlawfully expelled or suspended from a union may
sue for damages. Note, Liability of Labor Union or its Members for Unlaful SlAspen-
sion or Expidsion of Member, 62 A.L.R. 315 (1929). The advantage of such a suit, when
reinstatement is not desired, is that it is excepted from the rule requiring exhaustion of in-
ternal remedies. See note 24 supra. In addition to direct damages, judgments have been
awarded for mental anguish, loss of participation in membership activities, and as punish-
ment for malice. Id. at 316-17.
28. The rule that unincorporated unions are not suable as entities at law persists in
some states, although abrogated by statute in most states, including Wisconsin. 2 Trauxit,
LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, §§ 462, 465 (1940 and Cum. Supp. 1947) ;
Cole, The Cizil Suability, At Law, Of Labor Unions, 8 FoRD. L. Rnv. 29, 32-3 nn. 17-19
(1939). In the absence of statute, a class suit in equity is often available to secure judg-
ments against union funds. Witmer, Trade Union Liability: The Problem of the Un-
incorporated Corporation, 51 YALE L. J. 40, 43-46 (1941). But some jurisdictions forbid
a member to sue his union for damages. Id. at 63. On procedural difficulties as to neces-
sary parties in a class suit, see McMurray v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 54 F.2d 923
(C.C.A. 3d 1931); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Price, 108 S.W.2d 239 (Tex,
Civ. App. 1937). Though a union be suable, a money judgment may be difficult to ob-
tain. In New York, damages for wrongful expulsion are obtainable only on proof of
fraud or bad faith on the part of the membership as a whole. Browne v. Hibbets, 290
N.Y. 459, 467, 49 N.E. 2d 713, 717 (1943). See generally, Witmer, supra; Note, Liabil-
ity of Unincorporated Labor Organization to Suit, 149 A.L.R. 508 (1944). See note
48 infra for the federal practice.
29. State ex rel. Dame v. LeFevre, 251 Wis. 146, 28 N.W. 2d 349, 351-2 (1947). A
decision as to the proper remedy was made unnecessary by the court's ruling on the sub-
stantive issue. Left unanswered were the questions of whether mandamus may issue to an
unincorporated union (see note 25 supra), and whether plaintiff had sufficient "property
rights" to warrant equitable relief (see note 26 mtpra). Presumably damages would be
granted, even if these questions were answered in the negative (see note 27 supra).
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bership, the union constitution; and the "due process clauses of the state and
federal constitutions are not applicable to contract relationships between indi-
viduals."30
In this context, a Willistonian contract rationale seems peculiarly inapposite.
One may seriously question the doctrinal validity of applying standard qui'd
pro quo contract concepts to legal problems concerning the relations even be-
tveen truly voluntary organizations and their members.0 ' Relatively in-
significant social consequences obtain when the contract analogy is restricted to
genuinely voluntary associations. But to apply to unions what is at best a
dubious analogy in field of voluntary organizations, it is necessary to cate-
gorize unions as "voluntary." Commendable conclusions seldom derive from
unrealistic premises. If it is necessary to reason by analogy, reference of the
relations between union and member to the analogous relations between state
and citizen has the advantage of reality and the effect of focusing attention
upon the very real issues of operating democracy which are raised by litigation
like the Dame case-issues which are totally submerged by talk of "contract
relationships between individuals."
Furthermore, few courts adopting the "contract" theory have applied it in
the undiluted form manifested in the Dame decision. 32 Delimited though re-
view be under this judicial "hands-off" policy,m it has been broad enough in
30. Id. at 28 N.W.2d at 353. But cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)
(First Amendment protects sidewalk evangelists in company town); Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944) (political party is more than private club as regards restrictions on
primary voting) ; Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (C.C.A. 4th 1947), cert. denied, 68 S.Ct.
905 (1948); Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946) (see note 13 mpra);
Hurd v. Hodge, 68 S. Ct. 847 (1948) (court will not enforce private restrictive covenants).
See also Comment, Federal Power to Prosecute Violence Against Minority Groups, 57
YALEz L. J., 855 (1948); Note, Applicability of the Fourteenth Amendnnt to Prkate Or-
ganizations, 61 HARv. L. Rv. 344, 352 (1948) ("Whether or not it ever was the law, it is
not true today that 'Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the
Amendment."')
31. Professor Chafee has trenchantly criticized application of the "contract theory"
not only to labor unions, but to any voluntary association. Chafee, supra note 26, at
1001-07. "The member's 'contract' ... is often a legal fiction which prevents the courts
from considering. . . genuine reasons for and against relief." Id. at 1007.
32. Adherence to the contract analogy would require courts to review disciplinary
proceedings de novo, to interpret the terms of the constitution, and to enforce expulsions
conforming to the contract even though motivated by malice and/or lacking in procedural
due process. Id. at 1004-07. But courts do not follow such rules under the law of volun-
tary associations. See note 33 infra.
33. Courts assert they will not review the merits of the decisions of union tribunals
or their interpretation of valid union rules. Local Union No. 57, Brotherhood of Painters,
Decorators and Paperhangers of America v. Boyd, 245 Ala. 227, 234, 16 So2d 705, 711
(1944). But cf. Gordon v. Tomei, 144 Pa. Super. 449, 466, 19 A2d 553, 596 (1941)
(courts must make own interpretation of union rules and legal relations of members).
Review is confined to whether the member received a fair trial upon proper and sub-
stantial charges prosecuted in good faith and supported by evidence. OAxEs, op. cit.
supra note 25, § 61. However, even this limited review permits courts to supplement,
modify or disregard the consensual elements of the relation between the member and his
1948]
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the past to permit courts accepting jurisdiction to impose fairly adequate pro-
cedural standards by the familiar device of implying conditions into the con-
tract -4 proceedings lacking notice or hearing, even if expressly sanctioned by
the union rules, have been held void.35 But the Wisconsin court refused to
imply common standards of "fair play" where the union constitution was
merely silent on the matter of disciplinary procedure, and thus narrowed even
the limited interference usually permitted by the "contract" theory.
Though the case represents an extreme example of the "hands-off" attitude,
a modified policy of non-intervention is perhaps as much as can properly be
executed by the judiciary. The many legal obstacles placed before the expelled
union member seeking redress are clearly protective devices reflecting the
courts' recognition of their inability to administer a program of more extensive
review,36 or to cope with the complex internal disputes which underlie many
disciplinary actions. The judiciary is justifiably wary of tangling with conflicts
over political ideology, contests for union leadership, organizational rivalries,
struggles over economic militancy and clashes between local and national
union. Chafee, supra note 26, at 1005. An expulsion must be in accordance with the
"contract of membership," but in addition the rules and proceedings must not be contrary
to "natural justice." Id. at 1014.
34. "Whether or not the by-laws of an association provide for it, a member is en-
titled to know the charges against him, . . . to an opportunity to be heard, and a fair
trial." Glauber v. Patof, 183 Misc. 400, 402, 47 N.Y.S.2d 762, 763 (Sup. Ct. 1944). In-
deed, a Texas court felt constrained to reverse itself on rehearing to maintain consistency
of American authorities as to the need for notice and hearing. United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America v. Carpenter's Local Union No. 14, 178 S.W. 2d 558,
569 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944). Even a de facto member is entitled to such rights. Leo v.
Local Union No. 612 of International Union of Operating Engineers, 26 Wash. 2d 498,
174 P.2d 523 (1946). See also Coleman v. O'Leary, 58 N.Y.S. 2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1945)
(charges must specify act allegedly done by accused; member of trial committee may not
act as witness or prosecutor); Cohen v. Rosenberg, 262 App. Div. 274, 27 N.Y.S. 2d
834 (1st Dept. 1941) (expulsion voided where trial board prejudiced) ; Brooks v. Engar,
259 App. Div. 333, 19 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1st Dept. 1940) (accused has right to confront wit-
nessses against him) ; Gordon v. Tomei, 144 Pa. Super. 449, 19 A.2d 588 (1941) (prosecu-
tion must not be motivated by malice) ; Gallagher v. Monaghan, 58 N.Y.S. 2d 618 (Sup.
Ct. 1945) (violation of "natural justice" for president of international union to order ac-
cused to stand trial in distant city). However, accused's counsel may be excluded from
union trial, see Morgan v. Local 1150, United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, 72
N.E.2d 59 (Ill. 1947), and double jeopardy is permitted if authorized by union rules.
Simpson v. Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 83 W. Va. 355, 98
S.E. 580 (1919). But cf. Rueb v. Rehder, 24 N.M. 534, 174 Pac, 992 (1918). For addi-
tional cases see Witmer, supra note 8, at 632-3 nn. 36-41; Note, The Elements of a Fair
Trial in Disciplinary Proceedings by Labor Unions, 30 CoL. L. REv. 847, 856-9 (1930).
35. See cases cited Witmer, supra note 8, at 632, n. 36.
36. Pound, supra note 26, at 680. Bulging court dockets and delays in the administra-
tion of justice are continuing problems and sources of adverse criticism of the judiciary.
REP. ATT'Y GEN. 1-6 (1937) ; Barns, Efficient Court Structurc is Chief Preset Need, 22
J. Ams. Jun. Sody 251, 254 (1939). While contraction of jurisdiction enables courts to
stem the tide of such criticism, it is at the cost of leaving an aggrieved member remediless.
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power.37 It cannot be expected that the courts will so far retreat from their
present diffidence as to provide satisfactory procedural standards for the protec-
tion of the individual union member. s The time and expense of a court action,
the general unavailability of a stay of union disciplinary orders pending ex-
haustion of internal remedies,3 and the inadequacy of the remedy in damages
further underscore the need for a more effective instrument to supervise un-
ion disciplinary procedures.
40
An indirect and perhaps ill-considered attack on the problem has been made
by the Labor-Mlanagement Relations Act, 1947 (the Taft-Hartley Act).4 ' On
its face, the new Act embodies a "hands-off" policy by protecting "the right of
a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or
retention of membership therein.142 Specifically rejected by Congress was a
proposal in the House version of the bill to make it an unfair labor practice for
a labor organization to "expel or suspend any member without affording him an
37. A-SEiCAN CiviL LIBERTIES UNION, op. cit. supra note 8, at 35-40; Comment,
Disputes Within Trade Unions, 45 YArm L. J. 1248 (1936).
38. Where relief has been granted, adequate standards of "fair play" have evolved.
But courts -would seem to lack the special competence to dispose of underlying substantive
issues in the vocabularly of procedural "due process." See Steever, supra note 11, at 221.
"Few are the issues of procedural due process ... that have not been raised where a
union's judgment has been attacked in court." Witmer, supra note 8, at 632.
Different standards may be necessary for unions at different stages of organization.
Too, domination of union tribunals may enable union officials to pay lip service to both
procedural and substantive "due process" and still discriminate against an accused. Par-
ticularly is this possible where tribunals are hand-picked by the president who may also
be the accuser. See Chamberlain, supra note 10, at 162-5. Expertise is demanded in the
handling of such problems.
39. But cf. Powell v. United Ass'n of Plumbers, and Steamfitters, 240 N.Y. 616, 143
N.E. 728 (1925) (consolidation of local unions stayed pending appeal to convention).
40. Recourse to administrative agencies by ousted members is generally fruitless. In
Massachusetts, however, an employee expelled from a union may appeal to the State
Labor Relations Commission before he is discharged from his employment under a union-
security contract. The Commission may order a union, in the union's discretion, to restore
the employee to membership, or to refrain from seeking his discharge. Mass. Acts 1947,
c. 657, §§ 1, 2, 6, amending Mass. Gen. Laws c. 150 A (1932). See Cox, Some Aspects of
the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Htmv. L REv. 274, 295-6 (1948). Cer-
tain agencies may exercise informal persuasive powers with unions in this connection.
See, e.g., Glauber v. Patof, 183 Misc. 400, 403, 47 N.Y.S. 2d 762, 764 (1944) (Nev York
State Labor Relations Board requested union to reconsider an expulsion which occurred
without notice or hearing). Federal and state labor relations boards could bring indirect
pressure for reinstatement by refusing to certify a union which violates procedural "due
process" as collective bargaining representative. This is NLRB policy as regards unions
which practice discriminatory admission policies. 10 N.L.R.B. ANN. RR. 17-8 (1946).
However, it is questionable whether Congress intended for the Board to use such indirect
pressure to force reinstatement under the Taft-Hartley Act since Section 8(b) (1) in-
sulates internal union affairs from Board interference.
41. Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 (Cum. Supp.
1947), hereafter referred to by section number only.
42. §8(b) (1).
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opportunity to be heard." 48 Nevertheless the Act does place an effective curb
on union disciplinary proceedings, for it makes it an unfair labor practice for a
union to discriminate against, or cause an employer to discriminate against, an
employee expelled from the union for any substantive reason other than his
failure to pay dues and initiation fees.44 An employer is also guilty of an un-
fair labor practice if he bows to union pressure and discharges such an em-
ployee.45 By according job protection even to members expelled after a fair
trial on reasonable substantive grounds, the Act vitiates the union's strongest
disciplinary sanction.46 It thus'becomes less hazardous for members who
would destroy the union to engage in disruptive activities-a result hardly bal-
ancing the conflict between the polar objectives of individual democracy and
group discipline.47
On the other hand, the unfairly expelled union member is left without
suitable relief under the Act. Although he is somewhat aided by the statute in
a damages action against the union,48 he must still rely for reinstatement on the
43. H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(c) (6) (1947). The "Limitations" section of
the Act, which acquiesces in state anti-strike and anti-union shop laws, is silent on the
effect of the Act on state regulation of internal union affairs. §§ 13 and 14 (b). It is
therefore arguable that Congress intended to pre-empt the field and make the internal
affairs of unions which "affect" interstate commerce free from state as well as federal
control. It is more probable, however, that a Congress which otherwise placed many
curbs on unions meant only to free unions from NLRB control of internal affairs, and to
leave undisturbed existing state statutory and judicial regulation thereof.
44. §8(b)(2). The provision enjoining union discrimination against the employee
apparently embodies the "fair representation" principle of the Steele and Tunstall cases.
A union certified as exclusive bargaining representative must bargain in good faith for
non-union as well as union workers under this theory of "representation without represent-
ation." Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) ; Tunstall v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944). Attempts by unions
to blacklist expelled members would also seem to be prohibited,
45. § 8(a) (3). One writer warns that this provision will encourage employers to
meddle in internal affairs of unions. Watt, The New Deal Court, Organized Labor, and
the Taft-Hartley Act, 7 LAw GUILD Rv. 193, 211 (1947). While an expellee is thus pro-
tected in his job, other very important incidents of union membership remain unprotected.
See notes 6 and 7 t.npra.
46. Union sanctions may include reprimand, fine, suspension, expulsion and discharge
under a union security agreement. See note 16 stpra. "We may in many cases be willing
to see the recalcitrant member expelled from the bargaining organization where we
should object to his being deprived of an accustomed livelihood. We may in other in-
stances conclude that even the pressure of expulsion alone ought not to be permitted,
And we may quite often believe that the union should be free to impose whatever discipline
it chooses." Witmer, supra note 8, at 627. These difficult questions would seem best left
for determination in each case by an expert body if societal supervision of substantive
grounds for discipline were instituted.
47. Not only are employer spies and/or dual unionists protected in their jobs; but if
the union is a certified bargaining representative, it is duty bound to represent them on a
non-discrimiiiatory basis. See note 44 supra.
48. § 301(b). "Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry
affecting commerce ... may sue or be sued as an entity . . . in the courts of the United
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judicial remedy, the inadequacies of which remain unaffected. It may even be
questioned whether state courts will continue their limited interference with
procedurally defective expulsion proceedings since the right to a job-the
main "property right" motivating equity court interference in the past- 49 is
protected by the Act.
The present insufficiency of judicial and statutory machinery begs more
fundamental Congressional action. A statute requiring unions to adhere to
specified high standards of procedural "due process," such as has been passed
in one state,50 would seem to represent an effective solution. Enforcement of
the legislation could best be lodged, not in the courts, but in the National La-
bor Relations Board, with authority to prosecute violations as unfair labor
practices.51 It would also seem advisable to provide for stay of union penalties
pending internal union and NLRB review, in order to mitigate economic and
social damages.5 2
Failure of Board efforts at informal settlement5 3 would bring formal com-
plaint procedures54 into action in behalf of a victimized member, thus sparing
him the expense of court litigation. Coverage would be nationuide, an evolv-
ing uniformity of standards adjusted to the needs of unions at different stages
States. Any money judgment.., shall be enforceable only against the organization as
an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual mem-
ber or his assets." Prior to the Act, unions were classified as entities for federal juris-
dictional purposes only if a federal question were involved, or if unions were so classified
under state law. FED. 1. Crv. P., 17 (b).
49. See note 26 supra.
50. Tax. Ray. Crv. STAT. ANN., tit. 83, art. 5154a § 10 (Vernon, Supp. 1946). En-
forcement of a reinstatement provision is through the courts, which mars the statute's ef-
fectiveness. However, § 11 making violation of the statute a misdemeanor may servc-
aside from deterring abuses-as an indirect pressure to compel reinstatement. Section 11
is enforceable only by a state official. Lundine v. McKinney, 183 SMW. 2d 265, 273 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1944). Compare the Massachusetts statute, note 40 m.tra.
51. This method of enforcement was embodied in a proposed bill covering all phases
of internal union democracy. Amxmxcx Cwvm LamrTms UNm., B., To Aztw mT
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, (1947). A purpose of the bill was to avoid the need
for outlawing the closed shop by promoting internal democracy. Labor acceptance of such
a bill might well have avoided the more restrictive provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act.
52. A bond could be posted by the union in situations where it is necessary for sanc-
tions to be enforced at once, e.g., during a strike, or during a life and death struggle with
a rival union.
53. An informal conference of interested parties to an unfair labor practice charge--
employer, union, complaining member-is usually arranged where each party can openly
state his position without being held to any admissions made. Such discussion often sets
the groundwork for a voluntary settlement. A'r'Y GEN's Com.. Av. Poc., NLRB
MONOGRAPH No. 18, 10-12 (1940). This practice is largely responsible for the commend-
able record of the Board in closing 93 percent of the unfair labor practice charges at the
informal level in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1947. 12 N. L. R. B. AxNN. REP. 2
(1947). It would appear that a procedure capable of effectively settling charges against
employers would be equally effective in disposing of charges by members against unions,
and in educating union leaders in the standards of "fair play" required by law.
54. Arr'Y GEN's Com. AD. PRoc., NLRB MONOGRAPH No. 18, 18-73 (1940).
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of development would simplify the task of union compliance, while enforce-
ment would be facilitated by the expertise and experience of the NLRB.
In this way the rights of individuals deprived of the significant incidents of
union membership without procedural "due process" could be protected, while
the union's disciplinary sanctions would remain unfettered. Development of
substantive standards whereby the exercise of union discipline may be judged
must be a process of slow accretion.5 5 A more limited, but nevertheless valu-
able democratic objective is obtainable today-procedural due process.50
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN OVER-THE-COUNTER
TRADING:
THE INABILITY of non-professional investors to discover independently the
market price of securities traded off the exchanges has presented the Securities
and Exchange Commission with a major problem in investor protection.1
In theory, information about over-the-counter price movements is available
to the public from the "specialists," who perform the function of exchanges
55. It is of course possible for union officials arbitrarily to expel members on vague
substantive grounds while adhering to high procedural standards. Experience under a
system of efficient enforcement of procedural "due process" would provide necessary data
for a judgment as to the feasibility of societal supervision of substantive grounds for
discipline through an administrative agency.
56. The possibility of undue interference in internal affairs and fettering of disciplin-
ary proceedings with a myriad of technicalities by over-zealous administrators should be
recognized. Suggestions have been made that unions form a court composed of impartial
friends of labor to which aggrieved members could resort for quick review of final de-
cisions within their unions. Taft, supra note 9, at 385. See also Mark Starr's comments
on Taft, Democracy i Trade Unions, 36 Am. EcoN. REv. Supp. 359, 379 (1946). Such
a court might utilize the services of impartial umpires in various industries to achieve
nationwide coverage. Decisions of the court could be accorded the same status of con-
clusiveness given awards under arbitration agreements. SruRGEs, COMMERcml. AaiuTRA-
TIONS AND AwARDs, § 235 (1930). Action of this sort on labor's part might well head off
societal interference.
* Arleen W. Hughes, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 4048, Feb. 20,
1948, as supplemented by Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 4073, April 5, 1948.
1. A great majority of all bond transactions takes place in the over-the-counter
market. And although exact figures are not available, the value and volume of other
over-the-counter trading is known to be enormous. SEC, REPORT ON FEASIBILITY AND
ADvIsABLiTY OF THE COMPLETE SEGREGATION OF THE FuNcrIoNs OF DEALER AND BRoKER
67 (1936) (hereinafter cited as SEC, REPORT). The number of stock and bond issues
traded over-the-counter far exceeds that of securities listed on the exchanges. SEC, REOI,0T
supra at 67; Lesh, Federal Regulation of Over-the-Counter Brokers and Dealers it; Se-
curities, 59 HARv. L. REv. 1237, 1239 (1946).
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NOTES
by their continued readiness to buy or sell particular securities.2 In fact, the
difficulty in locating the proper specialist forces the public to deal with broker-
dealers on the basis of second-hand information furnished by them.a Since
the broker-dealers usually transact business as principals,4 investors must
depend for protection on the integrity of their trading adversaries.
Such integrity has been encouraged by two enunciations of Commission
policy. In Matter of Duker and Dukcr, the Commission revoked the license
of a broker-dealer for "unreasonable" mark-ups over the current market price
of securities.5 And the SEC has recently supplemented the Duker doctrine
with specific disclosure requirements.
In Matter of Arleen TV. Hughcs, 'Mrs. Hughes, registered with the Com-
mission as a professional investment adviser and a broker-dealer,7 traded for
her own account with customers to whom she rendered paid advice. Despite
the registrant's contention that a cryptically phrased memorandum afforded
her clients sufficient notice of her capacity and of the cost and market price of
securities handled as well, few of her customers had deduced these facts from
Characteristics of a security, vhich make it suitable for over-the-counter trading, in-
clude: 1) lack of speculative interest; 2) small capitalization; 3) limited distribution;
4) high price and 5) desirability for the portfolios of such institutions as insurance com-
panies. Tw=rrH CENTURY FUN), THE SECURITY IMLRtTs 263 (1935). But small
buyers also trade extensively in over-the-counter securities. See p. 1320 infra.
2. These dealers are "the medium through which supply and demand over a period
of time set the price." DIcE AND ErrF-EAN, THE SToc, MARK-r 107 (1941). Their re-
muneration is the difference between the bid and asked prices quoted by them. LOESEI,
TuE OvER-THE-CouNTER SEcuRIarms MAR ET 43 (1940). For other aspects of the
specialist's activities, see id. at 10-12, 35-46.
3. Ability to identify a particular security with its specialists derives primarily from
trading experience of which the broker-dealers have a virtual monopoly. SEC. Rro. r
65-6; TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, op. cit mipra note 1, at 265. In addition to securing
bid and asked prices directly from the specialists, broker-dealers derive some information
from quotations circulated exclusively to them by private services. SEC, RzrorT 65;
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, op. cit. mpra note 1, at 265; Lesh, supra note 1, at 1242-3.
4. Lesh, supra note 1, at 1240.
5. 6 S.E.C. 386 (1939). Under the theory behind the Dither decision a broker-
dealer's entry into security transactions carries an implied representation that he will
treat fairly with customers; when his prices are not reasonably related to current market
conditions, his representation is fraudulent. For a collection of SEC decisions following
the Duker case, see 10 SEC ANN. REP. 74, n. 56, 57 (1944). The Du!er rule received
judicial approbation in Charles Hughes & Co., Inc. v. SEC 139 F2d 434 (C.C.A. 2d
1943), cert. denied, 321 U. S. 786 (1944).
6. Arleen W. Hughes, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 4048, Feb.
20, 1948, as supplemented by Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 4073, April
5, 1948.
7. "Use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of commerce" in connection
with his business is denied to any broker-dealer or investment adviser who is not reg-
istered with the Commission. Securities Exchange Act, § 15(a), 49 STAT. 1377 (1936),
15 U.S.C. §78o(a) (1940); Investment Adviser's Act, §203(a), 54 STAT. 850 (1940),
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (1940).
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the document's obscure terminology.8 Acting under the broad antifraud pro-
visions of both the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act,0 the SEC
revoked Mrs. Hughes' registration ° on the ground that a broker-dealer
occupying a fiduciary relationship could not trade as principal with customers
without disclosing his capacity, the cost to him and the market price of the
securities he buys or sells.1
8. The cost and market price information consisted of intricate formulae, solution
of which demanded a high degree of mathematical competence. Arleen W. Hughes, Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 4048, supra note 6, at 1. Most clients con-
sidered the agreement to be thoroughly innocuous. It was "some legality 'that It was
necessary for the office to go through with'; 'a protection'; 'just according to comply
with the law'; or 'simply a business arrangement'." Id, at 13.
It does not appear, however, that Mrs. Hughes' mark-ups were unreasonable in any
transaction.
9. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 makes it illegal "... 1) to employ
any . . . artifice to defraud, or 2) to obtain money or property by . .. any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made ... not misleading, or 3) to engage in any transaction . ..
which operates . . . as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." 48 STAT. 84 (1933), 15
U.S.C. §77q (1940).
Sections 10(b) and 15(c) (1) of the Securities Exchange Act outlawed "manipula-
tive, deceptive Or other fraudulent" devices and invested the Commission with power to
define these malpractices. 48 STAT. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1940); 49 STAT.
1378 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1) (1940). Subsequent Commission definitions, relied
upon in the instant case, are a virtual paraphrase of the provisions of Section 17(a) of
the Securities Act, supra. Rule X-10B-5, 17 CODE FED. Raas. § 240.10b-5 (Cum. Supp,
1944); Rule X-15C-2, 17 CODE FED. REGS. § 240.15c-2 (1939), as redesignated, 17 CODE
FED. REos. 240.15cl-2 (Cum. Supp. 1944).
10. Revocation of broker-dealers' registration is authorized by § 15(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act. 49 STAT. 1378 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (1940). The violator
is also subject to criminal penalties, Securities Exchange Act, § 24, 48 STAT. 87 (1933),
15 U.S.C. § 77x (1940) ; Securities Exchange Act, § 24, 48 STAT. 904 (1934), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1940) ; and to suits for rescission or money damages. Securities Ex-
change Act, §29(b), 48 STAT. 904 (1934), as amended, 52 STAT. 1076 (1938), 15 U.S.C.
§78cc(b) (1940) ; Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin Inc., 40 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
See Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422, 427 (C.C.A. 2d 1944); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
Discovery of violations normally occurs in the exercise of visitorial powers granted
to the Commission by § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. 48 STAT. 897 (1934), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1940). Of the 4,000 to 4,500 broker-dealers registered with
the Commission over an ordinary twelve-month span, as many of 1,087 broker-dealer
houses have been investigated in one year. 10 SEC ANN. REP. 70, 73 (1944), 11 SEC
ANN. R P. 22 (1945); 12 SEC ANN. REP. 33 (1946).
11. By market price is meant the best bid or asked quotation ascertainable front spe-
cialists, in the exercise of "reasonable diligence." Arleen W. Hughes, Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 Release No. 4048, supra note 6, at 7, 9, 19.
All disclosures must be made prior to completion of each transaction in a manner so
clear that each client can be expected to understand their significance. The amount of
information necessary to impart such understanding will vary according to the experience
of the customer. Id. at 12, 14, 19. Rule X-15C1-1 (b) defines "completion of the trans-
action" generally as the time when the security is delivered or payment is made, which-
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Since professional investment advisors are universally conceded to be fidu-
ciaries, 12 the finding of a fiduciary relationship in the instant case was inevit-
able. More difficult is a decision as to the existence of such a status when the
advice is given without obligation to pay.1 3 For this determination the Com-
mission, in the Hughes case, essayed a distinction by way of dictum between
non-fiduciaries, whose advice is "incidental," and fiduciaries, whose advice
follows the "cultivating of a position of trust and confidence."14 Conceivably,
the "cultivation" category might embrace all attempts to instill trust, whether
the attempts were successful or not. If so, virtually every broker-dealer
would be labeled a fiduciary, since attempts at such instillation usually precede
or attend the transmission of specific suggestions.15
But such a literal application of the "cultivation" yardstick seems unlikely
ever is last. 17 CODE FED. REGS. §240.15c-1 (1939), as redesignated, 17 CoDE FE. REGs.
§ 240.15ci-1 (Cum. Supp. 1944).
12. Registrant in the instant case admitted her fiduciary status. Arleen I. Hughes,
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 4048, stpra note 6, at 7. For voluntary
acknowledgement of this status by other professional investment advisers, see Hearings
before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. 713, 719-20
(1940). See also Lee, The Financial House And Its Customers, 15 B. U. L. Rnv. 234,
237-8 (1935).
13. Even where there is a fiduciary relationship, it is highly improbable that the
Hughes rule will apply to all transactions in unlisted securities. In 1942 the Commission
circulated a proposed rule which would have required market price disclosure in every
over-the-counter deal. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 3940, April 2, 1947.
The proposal was completely scrapped, however, on the questionable theory that trans-
actions in securities specifically exempted from other provisions of the Securities Ex-
change Act, although not mentioned in the anti-fraud section pertaining to broker-
dealers (§ 15(c) (1) supra note 9), were nevertheless beyond the reach of that provi-
sion. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 3940, mipra. For a listing of classes
of "exempted securities" see Securities Exchange Act, § 3(a) (12), 48 STAT. 334 (1934),
15 U.S.C. §78c(12) (1940).
The Hughes doctrine also appears unnecessary where the fiduciary does not trade
for his own account. Under Rule X-15C1-4 every broker-dealer, regardless of fiduciary
relationship, must declare in writing to his customers whether he is acting as principal
or agent. 17 CODE FED. REms. § 240.15c-4 (1939), as amended, 17 CoDE FED. Rens.
§240c-1-4 (Cum. Supp. 1944). If he confirms as agent under the rule, lie must disclose
further the name of the person with whom he has dealt for his client and the source and
amount of all commissions received in connection with the transaction. Ibid. These dis-
closures would seem to fulfill the same function as those required by the Hughes case.
If the broker-dealer confirms as principal, he is subjected to no other duties under
Rule X-15C1-4.. Ibid. The Hughes holding, on the other hand, will presumably require
capacity disclosure of a more extensive nature. See note 11 mtpra.
14. Arleen W. Hughes, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 4048, supra
note 6, at 12.
15. For the universality of the broker-dealers' practice of "culti-ating trust and
confidence" see 10 SEC ANN. REP. 74 (1944) ; SEC, RErooRT 71, 72.
The rendering of investment advice is a "common practice of over-the-counter firms
generally.' Arleen IV. Hughes, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 4048,
supra note 6, at 12. See also SEC, REPoRT 72.
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in view of the conspicuous citation of court cases to buttress the Hughes hold-
ing: judicial authority has established the probability of customer reliance
as the determinant of a fiduciary status."' Indicators of the probability of
reliance have included the regularity of patronage,1" and the use of words of
agency by the customer where securities or funds are entrusted to the broker-
dealer.' s Most important, however, is the degree of customer sophistication :19
the broker-dealer who is a fiduciary when transacting business with an ignor-
ant and aged widow is more apt to be a non-fiduciary when dealing with an
experienced investor.20  The fact that there is little purpose in forcing the
16. E.g., Haines v. Biddle, 325 Pa. 441, 188 Atl. 843 (1937) (fiduciary relationship
where customer sold stocks in reliance on advice received); Birch v. Arnold & Sears,
288 Mass. 125, 130, 192 N.E. 591, 593 (1934) (fiduciary relationship where every invest-
ment was made by customer "in reliance on the statements and advice of Arnold");
Dwight v. Hazlett, 111 W. Va. 109, 113, 161 S.E. 434, 436 (1931) (no fiduciary relation-
ship where customer "perceived the effect of this course of dealing and . . . acted in the
light thereof") ; Steiner v. Hughes, 172 Oki. 268, 270, 44 P2d 857, 860 (1935) (no
fiduciary relationship where customer "on the very morning in question had called other
dealers to ascertain what was the market price of this particular stock. .. ").
17. Williams v. Boiling, 138 Va. 244, 250, 121 S.E. 270, 271 (1923) (fiduciary rela-
tionship where customer was "constantly seeking the advice and judgment" of brokers
with whom he had traded for years).
18. E.g., McNulty v. Whitney, 273 Mass. 494, 174 N.E. 121 (1930) (broker re-
ceived funds with instructions to purchase stocks for customer) ; Wisbey v. Alan Shep-
ard & Co., 268 Mass. 21, 167 N.E. 334 (1929) (customer delivered stocks to dealer to
sell for him) ; Johnson v. Winslow, 155 Misc. 170, 279 N.Y.S. 147 (Sup. Ct. 1935),
aff'd, 246 App. Div. 800, 285 N.Y.S. 1075 (1936), aff'd, 272 N.Y. 467, 3 N.E. 2d 872
(1936) (customer believed that agency relationship existed where securities were deposited
with broker-dealer).
The Commission has invoked court tests of fiduciary relationship to strengthen hold-
ings in cases applying the Duker rule. See Allender Company, Inc., 9 S.E.C. 1043, 1053
(1941) (combination of inexperience of customers, discretionary trading authority and
words of agency) ; William J. Steelmack Corp., 11 S.E.C. 601, 617-8 (1942) (clear cus-
tomer reliance on advice) ; Trost & Company, Inc., 12 S.E.C. 531, 536 (1942) (words of
agency and customer's belief that company was acting as agent). Seutble, Oxford Com-
pany, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3769, pp. 8, 9, 14-5 Jan. 4, 1946; Norris
r. Hirshberg, Inc., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 3776, pp. 22-3 Jan. 24,
1946. For analysis of the foregoing cases, see Lesh, siupra note 1, at 1248-58, 1262-8,
19. Fiduciary relationship: Norris v. Beyer, 124 N.J.Eq. 284, 1 A. 2d 460 (1938)
(customer was 75-year-old retired domestic servant) ; Butcher v. Newburger, 318 Pa.
547, 179 At. 240 (1935) (customer unable to distinguish between Class A and common
stock) ; Birch v. Arnold & Sears, Inc., 288 Mass. 125, 192 N.E. 571 (1934) (client had to
be instructed how to clip coupons from bonds) ; Tatsuno v. Kasai, 70 Utah 203, 259 Pac,
318 (1927) (customer was uneducated and inexperienced) ; Wahl v. Tracy, 139 Wis. 688,
121 N.W. 660 (1909) (customer was surgeon unfamiliar with security transactions), No
fiduciary relationship: Steiner v. Hughes, 172 Oki. 268, 44 P.2d 857 (1935) (customer
was experienced real estate and stock trader) ; Dwight v. Hazlett, 111 W. Va. 109, 113,
161 S.E. 434, 435 (1931) (customer was a merchandise broker who "had wide experience
in dealing in stocks"); Trowbridge v. O'Neill, 243 Mich. 84, 89, 219 N,W. 681, 683
(1928) ("purchaser knew just as much as the broker knew himself. . ").




broker-dealer to show his hand to such an investor also points to the Com-
mission's adoption of the courts' standard of reliance.
Although coincidence of the Commission's fiduciary criteria with those of
the courts appears likely, the obligations imposed by the two on discovered
fiduciaries will necessarily differ. Whereas the Hughes decision requires
divulging of market price, cost and capacity, the judicial rule holds that only
capacity need be revealed. 21  From this disclosure courts have implied that
the ensuing transaction enjoys the client's informed consentu on the apparent
assumption that, thus warned, the clients can protect themselves by checking
elsewhere the value of the securities involved.2 Since only broker-dealers can
discover these facts,2 4 intelligent assent by customers to over-the-counter
transactions is, under the court rule, purely fortuitous.
Plugging this gap by compelling disclosure of market price may well render
superfluous the revelation of capacity and cost. The customers' knowledge
of these items scarcely affects desirability of the transaction once the broker-
dealer has disclosed the best price available from the specialist. Furthermore,
cost, in most instances, will coincide with market price since broker-dealers
usually cover transactions with clients by simultaneously executing other
deals with specialists.26  But the apparent non-utility of the cost and capacity
aspects of the Hughes doctrine does not vitiate the value of the doctrine itself.
These seemingly redundant requirements inflict no onerous duty on the broker-
dealers, and the rule's core, that customer reliance demands disclosure of
market price, affords needed protection to unsophisticated investors in un-
listed securities.
21. Schofield v. Jackson, 99 Conn. 515, 122 At. 98 (1923) (no further disclosure re-
quired of fiduciary who revealed that he was selling his own stocks). Although no other
case directly holds that disclosure of capacity discharges fiduciary obligations, dicta to
this effect have been sprayed liberally throughout opinions holding the fiduciary's dis-
closure inadequate. See, e.g., In re B. Solomon & Co., 263 Fed. 108, 112-3 (C.C.A. 2d
1920) ; Haines v. Biddle, 325 Pa. 441, 444, 188 Atl. 843, 845 (1937).
The broker-dealer's failure to disclose capacity when selling to or buying from his
customer entitles the latter to rescind and elect between the status quo ante or an account-
ing for secret profits. Birch v. Arnold & Sears, Inc., 288 Mass. 125, 172 N.. 571 (1934) ;
Tatsuno v. Kasai, 70 Utah 203, 259 Pac. 318 (1927). For a mixed collection of real
property and securities cases on this subject see Note, 62 A.L.R. 63 (1929).
22. Courts often state that a fiduciary may not deal for his own account without the
"confirmation ... [of his client .. .based on] full knowledge of all the facts." But
disclosure of capacity is the only issue considered by the courts in fixing a fiduciary's
obligations. See, e.g., Williams v. Boiling, 138 Va. 244, 256, 267-70, 121 S.E. 270, 273,
276-7 (1923).
23: By converting the fiduciary-client relationship into that of vendor and vendee,
judges have held that disclosure of capacity permits application of the doctrine of caveat
emptor. Compare Doyen v. Bauer, 211 Min. 140, 146, 300 NAV. 451, 455 (1941)(real
property), with Steiner v. Hughes, 172 Okl. 269, 270-1, 44 P.2d 857, 60 (1935) (se-
curities).
24. Seep. 1316-7 supra.
25. Although one court conceded the inadequacy of divulging capacity, it refused to
impose any duty of further disclosure. See Johnson v. Winslow, 155 Misc. 170, 17841,
279 N.Y.S., 147 158-9 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
26. TvwNTirrrH CNtruiy FuND, op. cit. supra note 1, at 266; Lesh, supra note 1,
at 59.
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